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Abstract
In 1980, the Federal Mining Act was introduced to govern the use of the German subsur-
face. By paying royalties, companies can get permission to exploit resources. Yet, there is 
no official report breaking down the payments for hydrocarbons and lignite, in particular 
regarding the effectively levied fees. Hence, the objective of this study is to provide an 
overview of the ownership and paid royalties, and to discuss the sustainable use and man-
agement of the German subsurface in the face of ecological, social, and economic impacts 
of resource exploitation. Our analysis shows that the subsurface is partly state- and partly 
company-owned. Lignite is almost exclusively privately owned by two companies. In con-
trast, hydrocarbons are predominantly state-owned. In 2017, on average 13% was paid in 
royalties for gas and 11% for petroleum. These royalties have minor impact on state budg-
ets. For instance, in the concerned state of Lower Saxony, the levies amount to 189 million 
€ or 0.6% of the state budget. Thus, the state income from royalties is low. However, local 
communities and property owners have no financial benefits. Finally, to obtain a more sus-
tainable use of subsurface, the current Federal Mining Act must be adapted to account for 
environmental and social impacts.
Keywords Royalties · Subsurface governance · Energy policy · Sustainability · Mining law
1 Introduction
Due to the increase in global population and the resulting increasing demand of energy and 
natural resources, there is an urgent need for sustainable use and management of the sub-
surface and its resources (Jerneck et al. 2011). For instance, Velis et al. (2017) have inves-
tigated the sustainable use of groundwater resources and concluded that a sound under-
standing of local groundwater characteristics and human impacts is crucial to implement 
sustainable goals for this water resource. Furthermore, as urbanisation advances globally, 
sustainable development and management become even more crucial in urban areas (Bob-
ylev 2009).
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Hence, for a sustainable use and management of the subsurface and its resources, 
it is paramount to understand the subsurface’s ownership structures. According to the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI, a worldwide initiative for trans-
parency in the resource extraction sector featuring 53 national offshoots), Germany is 
one of the most transparent countries, when it comes to the exploitation of subsurface 
resources (EITI 2020). Yet, there is no official report breaking down the payments for 
hydrocarbons and lignite, in particular regarding the effectively levied fees. In our study, 
we therefore focus on the legal ownership of the subsurface in Germany and the royal-
ties paid for the use of natural resources, such as gas, petroleum, and lignite. The latter 
generates the overwhelming majority of these levies in Germany.
Khelil (1995) has categorised royalties alongside taxes and other levies as a part of 
a superordinate fiscal regime, setting the “price” or government’s take for the exploita-
tion of natural resources. This regime is then compared by private actors alongside local 
geology and other costs, in order to assess potential profits. Supporting this framework, 
Blake and Roberts (2006) have undertaken a comparison, analysing jurisdictions’ fiscal 
regimes in Canada, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe/Nigeria Joint Devel-
opment Zone, Tanzania, and Trinidad and Tobago. Discovering distortionary effects 
reducing the profit margins for higher production rates, the reduced incentives for 
higher reservoir recoveries for companies are criticised. Country-specific assessments 
of fiscal regimes have also been undertaken, for instance for low-grade hydrocarbons in 
China (Cui et al. 2011). The latter research has called for stronger incentives for private 
actors to exploit less profitable petroleum and gas fields in China, proposing to merge 
the different resource levies and reducing them to a range of 1% to 10%. However, these 
publications consider hydrocarbons as a pure economic good, without taking social and 
environmental implications into account. Consequently, the underlying objective is an 
extensive exploitation of the resources by increasing the investment attractivity for pri-
vate actors, ignoring potential negative societal impacts.
In his analysis of the South African mineral and petroleum resources royalty act, 
Cawood (2010) has also taken the societal significance of royalties into account. Further-
more, he has discussed the question, which level of government should be entitled to levy 
them and how they should subsequently be distributed. Plourde (2010) has conducted a 
similar study for the royalties on oil sands in Alberta, Canada. He has concluded that the 
role of the federal government as a fiscal player in oil sands development declined over 
time, inter alia, risking to finally pay a greater proportion for social and environmental 
consequences.
Currently, Germany is addressing an energy transition from fossil and nuclear to renew-
able energy sources. Thus, the use and management of the subsurface play an important 
role not only as a natural energy source for fossil energy, such as lignite and hydrocarbons, 
but also as a thermal, electrical, and material storage for natural gas, methane, hydrogen, 
carbon dioxide, and nuclear waste (Kabuth et al. 2016). According to the Federal Mining 
Act (Bundesberggesetz, BBergG), the use of the deeper subsurface in Germany is currently 
managed on the basis of ’first-come first-serve’, in which the first applicant is granted 
exclusive prospection and utilisation rights.
The Federal Mining Act (BBergG) was passed by the German parliament in August 
1980, replacing a variety of previous regional mining laws (Fig. 1). This law subdivides the 
ownership of the subsurface’s assets into freehold and freely mineable resources. With the 
possession of the ground comes the right of mining for the freehold resources. However, 
freely mineable resources, constituting the majority of subsoil assets, belong to the states 
(Fig. 1). Their rights of mining must be granted by the responsible mining authority of the 
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states. Hence, the federal states have the possibility to levy royalties on exploited freely 
mineable resources.
In general, the BBergG defines a standard royalty rate of 10%, but allows the states to 
adapt those rates within a range of 0% to 40%, as well as individually for each resource. 
A different legislation applies to resources subjected to so-called Old Rights. Those were 
granted before the inauguration of the Federal Mining Act and can therefore, following the 
superordinate German Basic Law, not be withdrawn (Fig. 1). Furthermore, resources sub-
jected to Old Rights are exempted from royalties.
In the last decades, following the rise of the environmental movement, public actors and 
various stakeholders have complained about the Federal Mining Act being obsolete with 
regard to social and environmental aspects, since it was mainly conceived as a law assur-
ing the raw materials supply. Those actors, including politicians, scientists, environmental 
groups, lawyers, and even the Federal Environmental Agency (UBA), criticise the lack of 
sustainability of the German Federal Mining Act, e.g. Penn-Bressel and Weber (2014), Hiß 
(2015), Beckmann (2015).
The Brundtland Report defines a sustainable development as a “development that meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs”. Furthermore, the report calls for an equivalent consideration of ecologi-
cal, social, and economic aspects. Passet (1979) has specified this definition by defining the 
social, ecological, and economic spheres as interdependent. Thus, a development is only 
genuinely sustainable, if those three spheres are individually sustainable and their concerns 
fully respected (Brundtland 1987). Based on this definition of sustainability, the question 
whether the German mining policy sustainably manages the subsurface in favour of its citi-
zens and the future needs are also discussed. Hence, the exploitation of German gas, petro-
leum, and lignite resources is specifically examined regarding the equilibrium between the 
three spheres.
The ecological sustainability mainly consists of the impacts on the environment. The 
effects on nature and the groundwater, as well as the emission of toxic gases and carbon 
dioxide, constitute the main-related aspects. The social sphere concerns the impacts on the 
people and communities. The associated major facets are the influence on people’s health, 
the effect on employment, and in the case of lignite, the relocation of inhabitants for open-
cast mining. However, currently only the economic sphere is thoroughly considered by the 
Fig. 1  Hierarchy of rules of the German mining legislation
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prospecting and exploring companies. Hence, a holistic and sustainable view of the subsur-
face is still lacking and therefore also discussed in this study.
2  Research methodology
This study primarily focuses on the royalties for hydrocarbons and lignite, whereby only 
in East Germany for the latter. This follows from the fact that the lignite resources in West 
Germany were already sold to companies long before the Federal Mining Act’s adoption 
(Kölnische Rundschau 1950). Hence, the Old Rights had to be acknowledged within the 
new legislation. This is not the case for the East German lignite, which was mainly priva-
tised within the reunification of 1990 and therefore a decade after the introduction of the 
Federal Mining Act (Schwenn 1994; DPA 1993).
The data originate from various sources. It has been gathered through a review of rel-
evant reports, informal interviews, and inquiries directed to the mining authorities.
2.1  Review of relevant reports
The main source of information for this research has been a variety of reports issued by 
public bodies, non-governmental organisations, trade associations, and companies.
The details about the paid royalties on petroleum and gas are taken from the 2018 report 
of the BVEG, the German petroleum and gas trade association (BVEG 2019). The report 
includes data voluntarily provided by various exploration and production (E&P) compa-
nies operating in Germany, enabling first estimates of the paid royalties. The accuracy of 
the data is not proven, since those statements are not compulsory or in any way legally 
binding. According to an employee of the BVEG, the numbers are rounded by the com-
panies and are only superficially reviewed by the trade association. However, this report 
is the only source subdividing the payments to the states into levies for petroleum and 
gas. Furthermore, the BVEG normalises the exploited gas volumes to a calorific value of 
CV = 9.7692  kWh/m3 , allowing a better assessment of the monetary value with the gas 
prices issued in €/kWh by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany (Destatis 2020b).
The paid acquisition prices for the East German lignite are part of business contracts 
and therefore kept under lock, with the archival thirty-year period expiring in the coming 
years. A 2013 parliamentary request by the Green Party in order to find out the buying 
prices of those lignite districts was denied due to contractual secrecy (Deutscher Bundestag 
2013). Nevertheless, circulated paid sums exist in contemporary newspaper articles and 
press agency reports (DPA 1993; Schwenn 1994).
2.2  Informal interviews
In order to classify the gathered information, many informal phone calls and email 
exchanges have been carried out. For instance, conversations with the Federal Environ-
mental Agency (UBA) have been used to locate general and sustainability issues within the 
German Mining legislation.
Exchanges with the majority of the state authorities for mining have been valuable to 
clarify the different regional regulations for hydrocarbons and their realisation. To take the 
industry’s perspective into account, phone interviews with E&P-companies and trade asso-
ciations have been conducted.
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Regarding lignite, communication with the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natu-
ral Resources (BGR) has been useful to clarify the legislative framework of the Old Rights. 
Several exchanges with parliamentarians and their consultants have been conducted to 
include the problems originating from the extraction of lignite.
2.3  Inquiries to the mining authorities
In order to receive improved data for the royalties, we have posed an inquiry to the Lower 
Saxony State Authority for Mining, Energy, and Geology (LBEG) following the Environ-
ment Information Act, which is derived from the Aarhus Convention (UNECE 2014). It 
allows the demand of available environmental information and obligates the concerned 
authority to hand over its data as fast as possible and normally within a month (BMJV 
2017). We have requested the available data about the petroleum and gas fields in Lower 
Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, and Bremen, especially the paid royalties, poten-
tial abatements, the offset on-site treatment costs, and the oil grade for the petroleum, to 
assess its value. We have asked to categorise the data into exploitation fields and years for 
the period from 2016 to 2018, sending the request on the 30th of July 2019. After consult-
ing the relevant companies, the LBEG has denied the inquiry on the 30th of October 2019 
on the ground that the requested data do not constitute environmental information and the 
access to this information is outweighed by the protection of company secrets. However, 
one company making up for 0.3% of the petroleum and 0.04% of the gas production in Ger-
many voluntarily has provided the requested information, thereby helping us to define the 
oil grade in the main petroleum area in the western part of Lower Saxony (BVEG 2019).
In order to eradicate the conflict arising through the protection of business secrets, we 
have posed a modified inquiry on the 15th of November 2019. We have requested the same 
information as in our first inquiry but grouped exploitation fields with the same royalty 
rates. This would have made it nearly impossible to allocate the paid royalties to specific 
fields and therefore to companies. In a phone call, an employee of the LBEG has explained 
that there was low prospect for our request since the demanded data still do not constitute 
environmental information in their opinion. Hence, we have finally decided to withdraw 
our second request on the 18th of December 2019.
2.4  Data assessment and processing
By comparing the data based on the BVEG reports (BVEG 2019) and on the second report 
published by the German EITI offshoot (D-EITI 2019), the accuracy of the former’s figures 
can be assessed. Given the fact that the D-EITI report does not categorise the states’ royal-
ties into the different subsoil assets, the comparison can only be made for states receiving 
no levies but for hydrocarbons. This is the case for Schleswig-Holstein (2016, 2017), Ham-
burg (2016, 2017), and Bavaria (2017), where the stated royalties in the BVEG report are 
between 1% and 10% above those stated by the D-EITI report. This divergence amounts to 
an average of 6.1% and is systematic.
In the case of the East German lignite, the buying prices were paid in German mark 
(DM) in 1993 and 1994. Hence, to be able to compare them to hypothetically owed roy-
alties, the inflation over the past three decades (issued by the Federal Statistical Office, 
(Destatis 2020c)) must be considered for both the buying prices and the levies. The com-
plete calculation path of the theoretically due royalties is described in "Appendix A1 and 
A2".
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3  Results
3.1  Petroleum and gas
The vast majority of the German petroleum and gas is subjected to the Federal Mining 
Act. This means, the resources are owned by the federal state and companies can only be 
granted rights of mining. In return, the federal states levy royalties. While in former West 
Germany, only few hydrocarbon sources are subjected to Old Rights, nearly all resources in 
the former East German states are company-owned. They were sold as resources subjected 
to Old Rights in the course of the reunification.
Due to state regulations, the royalty rates differ from state to state (Table  1; Figs.  2, 
3). Some states, mostly without revenues from royalties, rely only on the Federal Mining 
Act for hydrocarbons. Since it can be used to regulate the exploitation of resources, the 
governance varies throughout the other states. In recent years, Bavaria dropped the rate for 
hydrocarbons to zero, in order to create incentives to explore. Because of its inefficiency, 
Table 1  Legislative framework regarding royalties for petroleum and gas in the federal states
a Deduction of on-site treatment costs
b 5% on petroleum from the field Aitingen. Deduction of a flat fee of 25 €/tonne for on-site treatments
c Royalty for Breitbrunn-Eggstätt in form of a one-time payment of 300 000 DM
d Petroleum and associated gas excepted from Rühlermoor Valendis, Bramberge Emlichheim, and Georgs-
dorf are free of charge
e Reduced rates for reservoirs more difficult to exploit
f  15% on petroleum from Römerberg, 7% from Rülzheim
g Associated gas directly converted into electricity is free of charge
h Gas from the field Saarbrücken-Süd is free of charge
i  For the fields Nordsee A6/B4 and Heide-Mittelplatte I the rate for gas is 18% and between 21% and 40% 
for petroleum, depending on the current market value of petroleum (Fig. 4)
Federal state Royalty percentage Based on state 
royalty regula-
tionPetroleum Gas
Baden-Württemberg 19a 37a Yes
Bavaria 0b 0a Yes
Berlin and Brandenburg 1a 10a Yes
Bremen 10 10 No
Hamburg 7a 37a Yes
Hesse 10 10 No
Lower saxony 0a,d,e 27a,d,e Yes
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 10 10 No
North Rhine-Westphalia 10 10a,e For gas
Rhineland-Palatinate 12a,e,f 10f,g For petroleum
Saarland 10 10a,h For gas
Saxony 10 10 No
Saxony-Anhalt 10 10 No
Schleswig-Holstein 40a,i, 40a,i Yes
Thuringia 10 10 No
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the decision for this strategy was later withdrawn and a return to the BBergG’s rates is 
envisaged. In Lower Saxony, every petroleum source with an annual exploitation below 
30  000  t is exempted. Throughout Germany, only seven sources produce annually more 
than 30 000 t, with four sources in Lower Saxony only. The state also gives reductions on 
the royalty rates ranging between 50% and 75% for reservoirs more difficult to exploit.
In 2015, Schleswig-Holstein adopted a new regulation raising the royalty rates to the 
maximal rate of 40%. In order to reduce the impairment for running exploitations, a special 
formula was therefore implemented. The latter in particular addresses the largest petroleum 
field Heide-Mittelplatte I, producing 55% of Germany’s petroleum, and the only offshore 
gas field Deutsche-Nordsee A6/B4. While the royalty on gas amounts to 18%, the royalty 
rate on petroleum is defined by the following second-order binomial equation, considering 
the current petroleum market value:
with R as the royalty in percent and P as the petroleum price in Euro per ton. Furthermore, 
the regulation defines 21% and 40% as minimal and maximal royalty rate, meaning that for 
every petroleum price below 555,56 Euro per ton, the rate is set to 21%. When prospected 
onto the last fifteen years, the royalty rate never reached 22%, even though there were sig-
nificant petroleum price fluctuations (Fig. 4).
Hence, the paid royalty rate lies below the regulations’ standard rate in every state 
(Table 1, Fig. 3). This is caused by reductions for special sources and, more importantly, 
on-site treatment costs. The costs accruing from the on-site preparation of the resource 
can be offset from the initial payment. That is the main reason for the divergence between 
the rates provided in Table 1 and in Fig. 3. Significant revenues are only levied in three 
states, 189.1 million € in Lower Saxony mainly through royalties on gas, 63.2 million € 
in Schleswig-Holstein and 2.1 million € in Rhineland-Palatinate from petroleum (Fig. 2a).
Nevertheless, there is a sub-linear correlation between the proportion of the national 
resource production and the state-specific royalty rates. Federal states with a larger produc-
tion rate tend to levy higher effective royalty rates (Fig. 3).
(1)R = 0, 00013851 ⋅ P2 − 0, 15525 ⋅ P + 64, 5
Fig. 2  Paid royalties in the nine states with hydrocarbon exploitation (a) and share of their total state rev-
enues originating from royalties (b) in 2017  (Data source: BVEG (2019))
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3.2  Lignite
Legally, even though it constitutes a freely mineable resource, the vast majority of the 
German lignite is owned by private companies. There are three major lignite companies 
operating in Germany, RWE Power AG (RWE) in the Rhineland basin, MIBRAG in the 
Middle German basin, and LAUBAG in the Lusatian basin (Fig. 5). While the first com-
pany belongs to the RWE corporate group, MIBRAG and LAUBAG belong to a Czech pri-
vate equity firm with a focus on legacy energy sources. This company called Energetický a 
Prűmyslový Holding (EPH) is known for owning Europe’s most climate-damaging energy 
provider EP Power Europe (Smid 2017).
Fig. 3  Proportion of the production (italic) and effectively paid royalty rates (upright) for petroleum (a) and 
gas (b) in the German states (Data source: BVEG (2019))
Fig. 4  Royalty on petroleum 
from the biggest German field 
Heide-Mittelplatte I, since 
2015 depending on the current 
petroleum price following (Eq. 1) 
(Data source:LBEG (2019b))
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The ownership of the three main mining areas has different origins. The Rhineland 
basin has been owned by RWE since 1914, when it started its electricity production from 
lignite (Klein 1999). In contrast, the lignite in the Middle German and Lusatian basins was 
sold in the course of the reunification in 1993 and 1994, respectively (DPA 1993; Schwenn 
1994). Thus, it was sold more than a decade after the Federal Mining Act was adopted. 
Even though the new legislation did not offer any legal way for it, the lignite was sold as 
resource subjected to Old Rights.
Beside the privately owned areas, only smaller districts owned by the states of Saxony 
and Saxony-Anhalt remain. Hence, following the Federal Mining Act they would be sub-
jected to royalties, however, they are not levied. In Saxony, the state’s regulation explicitly 
exempts lignite from this levy, thereby potentially missing out on approximately 265 mil-
lion € (Kuhr 2016). Platter (2008) from Brandenburg’s parliament advisory service has 
authored a report, concluding that levying royalties on state-owned lignite would constitute 
an unequal treatment, given the fact that company-owned lignite is exempted. Hence, no 
royalties are levied on lignite.
For the two private companies, circulated purchasing prices exist. The MIBRAG was 
sold in December 1993 for 2 billion DM, including a 41.1% share of the planned power 
plant Schkopau, worth 2.7 billion DM (DPA 1993; Reuters 1993). The LAUBAG was sold 
in September 1994 for 2.1 billion DM (Schwenn 1994). Subtracting the share of the power 
plant and adjusting for inflation gives acquisition prices in 2020 of 0.64 billion € for the 
Middle German and 1.51 billion € for the Lusatian basin.
Figure 6 compares the prices to theoretically paid royalties (BBergG standard rate of 
10%) until the year of 2018. It shows that already in 2018, the latter would have been 
significantly higher than the paid acquisition prices. In addition, the paid sums not only 
include the rights of mining but whole running companies, with assets such as buildings, 
machines, liquidity. It is to be assumed that the lignite companies were sold below value, 
which was not an exception for privatisations during the reunification, as Bleicher (2007) 
states for the sale of the utility companies.
Fig. 5  Amount and value of 
the extracted lignite from the 
three lignite districts Rhineland 
(RWE), Lusatia (LAUBAG) and 
Central Germany (MIBRAG) 
in 2018 ("Appendix A1") (Data 
source:Statistik der Braunkohle 
(2019))
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4  Discussion
4.1  Petroleum and gas
Germany covers 58.4% of its primary energy needs with hydrocarbons, 34.9% with petro-
leum and 23.4% with gas (BP 2019). However, only a fraction originates from domestic 
sources. Given the fact that petroleum and gas are freely tradable resources, the German 
hydrocarbon combustion is independent from the domestic production. Reinforcing this 
effect, the German gas network will change from low caloric gas (L-Gas, mainly from Ger-
many and the Netherlands) to high caloric gas (H-Gas, mainly from Russia and Norway) in 
2030. Thus, in the future, it will no longer be able to transport its own domestic gas (Kand-
zorra 2020).
During the past decades, the reserves have massively declined. In 2000, the probable 
and proven gas reserves were about seven times greater than in 2018 (Fig. 7). The statisti-
cal range of coverage, showing the period the reserves last under the current production 
rate, has also drastically decreased. It amounted to less than seven years for petroleum and 
less than five years for gas in 2018 (Fig. 8). This is mainly due to the unsustainability of 
the Federal Mining Act. In §1 of the BBergG for instance, it is stated that the main aim 
of the law is to ensure the mineral supply. Hence, the mining authorities hardly have any 
decision-making scope for a denial of an application, if formalities of the application are 
satisfied (Kabuth et al. 2016).
A benefit of the exploitation of hydrocarbons in comparison to other sources of 
energy is the low space requirement. In order to exploit entire reservoirs, spaces below 
a hectare can be sufficient, reducing the impact on the surface environment. The main 
ecological issues are possible leakages (Davies et al. 2014). The transported liquids, the 
resource, and the reservoir water contain toxic substances such as mercury, benzene, or 
xylene (Schomann 2017). While the petroleum leakages mainly cause soil contamina-
tions, gas extraction also causes methane leakage. According to Howarth (2015), the 
average leakage for conventional gas extraction amounts to 4%. This has a significant 
impact on climate change, given the fact that methane is an about 86 times more harm-
ful greenhouse gas than CO2 . With regard to the greenhouse effect, this makes gas a 
more polluting source of energy than hard coal and petroleum (Howarth 2015).
By granting royalty reductions, the legislation provides companies with false incen-
tives. In Lower Saxony for instance, the state with the highest revenues from royalties, 
Fig. 6  Comparison of the acqui-
sition prices and a hypothetical 
royalty of 10% derived from the 
Federal Mining Act for the two 
coal-mining districts in East 
Germany, the Lusatian basin 
(LAUBAG) and the Middle Ger-
man basin (MIBRAG) ("Appen-
dix A1 and A2")
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three reductions’ effects are detrimental to the environment. For petroleum sources 
exploited with tertiary recovery methods, the original royalty rate is halved. Such meth-
ods consist of injecting fluids into the reservoir in order to increase the pressure and 
the fluid viscosity. However, this can induce seismicity, as it occurred in Lower Saxony 
(Schomann 2017). Tertiary recovery methods are also used to exploit gas from reser-
voirs with permeabilities below 0.6 millidarcy, which reduces the royalty rate by 75% 
for the first five years of the extraction. The state also reduces the rate by 40% for res-
ervoirs with extraction rates below 4 500 m3/h. The latter applies to more than half of 
the state’s sources (LBEG 2019a). However, as Balcombe et  al. (2017) have shown, 
these small onshore reservoirs constitute an above-average portion of methane leakages 
from conservative gas sources. Until today, the tertiary recovery methods in Germany 
mainly consist of hot water and steam injection, while the addition of chemicals is still 
uncommon.
In the face of the rising potential of German shale gas (Fig. 9), the current legisla-
tion has not been keeping up. Instead of banning or regulating fracking because it vio-
lates the precautionary principle, the government simply raised the hurdle by making 
small changes to the Water Protection Act (Engelhardt and Louis 2014). This caused 
Schleswig-Holstein to raise the royalties for hydrocarbons to the maximum rate to 
Fig. 7  Development of the 
proven and probable gas reserves 
compared to the annual gas 
consumption in Germany (Data 
sources: LBEG (1996-2019); BP 
(2019))
Fig. 8  Development of the statis-
tical range of coverage (quotient 
of reserves and extraction rate) 
of proven petroleum and gas 
reserves in Germany (Data 
source: LBEG (1996-2019))
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reduce the incentives for the cost-intensive fracking technology. In contrast, Lower Sax-
ony has had to grant claims for fracking, fearing actions for failure to act from the E&P-
companies (Wetzel 2016). Consequently, there is an urgent need to revise the law by 
including sustainability principles into the Federal Mining Act (BBergG).
In 2018, approximately 3000 people worked in the petroleum and gas resource sector. 
They are mostly based in Lower Saxony. Recently, it was disclosed that the extraction 
of hydrocarbons has negative impacts on the local population. In Rotenburg (Wümme), 
one of the main gas regions, the leukaemia case numbers for men have been twice as 
high as usual. In addition, other forms of cancer have occurred more frequently. Hence, 
families are concerned about their health (Betzholz and George 2016). This matches the 
results from previous research in North America, suggesting a correlation between the 
distance to gas wells and health impacts (McKenzie et  al. 2014; Kassotis et  al. 2014; 
Stacy et al. 2015).
The royalties have an impact of more than 0.1% of the budget in only two states. In 
Lower Saxony, they amount to 189.1 million €, and 0.62% of the state budget, which is 
roughly the equivalent of the housing and urban development expenses (MFNds 2017). 
In Schleswig-Holstein, the royalties’ share of the budget is 63.2 million € and 0.52% of 
the state budget, which is comparable to three quarters of the expenses for housing and 
urban development (FMSH 2017). For those payments, the companies provide 2.0% of the 
domestic petroleum and 6.4% of the gas needs (LBEG 2019a). According to the German 
petroleum and gas trade association (BVEG), these supplies make Germany less dependent 
on foreign resources. However, even if the autarky is increased during the time of produc-
tion, the dependency from other countries grows as the resource is constantly depleted. 
While the proven gas reserves in 2000 sufficed to supply Germany for three years, the 
reserves in 2018 could only cover a third of the domestic consumption (Fig. 7). In the case 
of a crisis, Germany barely holding any backup reserves would be at their suppliers’ mercy. 
The latter is a very critical aspect, as we can currently also observe during the coronavirus 
pandemic (COVID-19), in which countries are unable to match their own demand on pro-
tective clothing and masks. Thus, the aspect of independence of hydrocarbon imports in 
form of a strategic national reserve should be seriously considered for the future manage-
ment of domestic resources.
Fig. 9  Comparison of the annual 
gas consumption, the conven-
tional gas resources, and the 
shale gas resources in Germany 
(Data sources: BP (2019); LBEG 
(2019a); BGR (2016))
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4.2  Lignite
Through the company-ownership of the German lignite, the federal states have hardly 
any governance scope on the resource. Enforcing sustainable policies is therefore nearly 
impossible through state regulations. Even though a shortage of this resource is not to be 
expected in the next 200 years, a lot of other issues play a role concerning the sustainabil-
ity of lignite extraction (BP 2019). It is also important to assess the combustion of lignite, 
since it can only be used nationally. The high water and low energy content make transport 
unprofitable, especially compared to hard coal.
Additionally, lignite combustion massively pollutes the air (Wronski and Sorge 2015). 
Even though it contributed to less than 24% of the German electricity production in 2015, 
it emitted 45% of the carbon dioxide, 44% of the lead, 53% of the sulphur, 62% of the 
nitrous oxide, and 67% of the mercury emissions of the energy sector, among several other 
toxic emissions. Furthermore, it has massive impacts on water quality and groundwater 
levels (Drosihn et al. 2017). The recultivated areas often take years to redevelop a natural 
flora and fauna. Only after 40 years of recultivation, the soils recover their initial agricul-
tural quality (Wronski and Sorge 2015).
One of the main arguments for the continuation of lignite mining is the related employ-
ments. In January 2020, a total of 12 084 people was working in the lignite sector in Ger-
many (BMWi 2019). A small amount of those people works directly in lignite extraction, 
with potentially poor prospects in the current and future labour market. Although, accord-
ing to the European Parliamentarian Michael Bloss, the German state railway submitted 
takeover offers for many of those workers in the case of complete mine closures. Further-
more, lignite mining and combustion have negative impacts on the population, not only 
locally but also beyond the related regions. In order to make way for lignite exploitation, 
which is done in opencast mines in Germany, inhabitants are relocated, and villages demol-
ished. More than a 100 000 people within 90 years have lost their homes to opencast min-
ing and more are expected to be relocated in the next decades (Wronski and Sorge 2015). 
In addition, Jensen et al. (2013) calculated from governmental data that the German coal 
combustion annually costs 29 271 years of lifetime or 2 722 fatalities. The combustion of 
lignite contributes the major share to this figure.
Due to the sale of the companies in the nineties, the federal government obtained large 
sums. This money compensated in part the federal program restructuring the former East 
German companies before their privatisation. In addition, the lignite production increases 
the German self-sufficiency and renders the German energy supply less market depend-
ent. Furthermore, coal-based electricity is the cheapest available in Germany, far below 
the price of energy from renewable sources. This is not only due to the cheap resource, 
but mainly to a variety of subsidies. Those surpass by far the value of the mined lignite, as 
shown in Fig. 10 (Wronski and Sorge 2015). However, Rehbock and Kolbe (2013) show 
that the electricity price has very little impact on the economic power. Higher energy 
prices actually increase companies’ resilience to price variations and make them signifi-
cantly more energy efficient.
Unfortunately, the continuation of lignite combustion will also cost Germany large 
amounts of compensation payments. The Paris Agreement specifies that a CO2-surplus 
must be compensated through the European emissions trading system (Höhne and Fekete 
2019). According to the federal government’s 2019 projection report and climate protec-
tion plan, missing the target will cost between 25.8 and 27.8 billion € for the energy sector 
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alone (BMU 2016, 2019) ("Appendix A3"). Lignite contributes to almost half of these 
costs.
Moreover, the ability to cover the costs of recultivation seems uncertain for East Ger-
many’s lignite mining districts. The purchase of MIBRAG was massively financed from 
its own recultivation fund, whilst in the following years, significant profit transfers towards 
EPH took place. In total, those transactions summed up to more than 400 million €. Mean-
while, the recultivation fund contains merely about 200 million € and experts estimate that 
this amount will be insufficient for necessary future recultivation works (Landtag Branden-
burg 2017). In 2016, the Swedish state company Vattenfall sold LAUBAG without pur-
chase price to EPH (Berger 2016). Included were 15 billion Swedish kronor (SEK) (1.34 
billion €) in cash and 18 billion SEK (1.61 billion €) in the recultivation fund (Vattenfall 
2016). Greenpeace and a Mongolian investment group were excluded from the sale with-
out reasons, even though the latter was willing to pay up to 1.85 billion €. This exclusion 
led to an inquiry by the European competition authority (Iwersen 2016). Afterwards, Smid 
(2017) found out that the sale to EPH was arranged by the Ministry of Energy of Branden-
burg before Vattenfall publicly announced their willingness to dispose of LAUBAG. A 
month after the acquisition, one of the owners and the main financier of the deal was sold 
out of the holding for 3.25 billion €, which Smid (2017) assumes was done with money 
acquired from Vattenfall. By now, the recultivation fund holds about half of the required 3 
billion € and the company has been making triple-digit million losses in the recent years. 
Thus, there is currently no fulfilment of LAUBAG’s recultivation obligations in sight 
(Landtag Brandenburg 2017; Reiß and Harms 2018). Furthermore, the operative business 
is managed by a limited company. The ties to the owners include numerous shell compa-
nies, among others in the well-known tax havens of Luxembourg and Cyprus (Smid 2017). 
It is not clear yet, whether EPH would be liable for an insolvency of the operational limited 
company in the face of the recultivation costs (Reiß and Harms 2018). Hence, the German 
taxpayers risk to take the fall in the end and pay for the recultivation.
In 2020, the German government introduced a law to end the combustion of coal by 
2038. Thereby, the government planned to compensate the affected companies with more 
than 4 billion €, with 1.75 billion € to LAUBAG alone. Shortly after, reports surfaced, 
showing that the company itself previously planned to end the combustion earlier than 
the new law would require. After announcing to reconsider the compensations, the fed-
eral government has now decided to adopt the initial bill (Traufetter 2020; Flauger 2020). 
Nevertheless, there seems to be an exit for lignite combustion in Germany. In the context 
of nuclear energy, the Federal Constitutional Court set a precedence by emphasising the 
social obligation of property in the face of expropriation (Ekardt 2012). This means that 
Fig. 10  Value of the annually 
extracted lignite, the paid royal-
ties, and the total subsidies for 
lignite in 2015 ("Appendix A1") 
(Data source: (Wronski and 
Sorge 2015))
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compensations are not to be paid, if the expropriated subject harms society. In our opinion, 
this should also be applicable for lignite exploration and combustion.
5  Conclusions and recommendations
This case study attempts to close the information gap regarding the subsurface ownership 
structures and related royalty payments. Featuring abundant lignite and ordinary hydrocar-
bons resources, little is known about paid royalties in Germany. The research has revealed 
that the German subsurface is partly state- and partly company-owned. While lignite in for-
mer West Germany belongs to the joint-stock company RWE, the vast majority of hydro-
carbons belong to the federal states. In East Germany, nearly all resources were privatised 
in the course of the reunification and the overwhelming majority of the lignite is in the 
hands of a private equity firm. The company-owned minerals are free of royalties, and the 
benefits remain within the mining companies. For the state-owned hydrocarbons, an aver-
age of 13% for gas and 11% for petroleum were levied in royalties in 2017. This equals to 
173.3 million € for gas and 80.6 million € for petroleum (BVEG 2019). However, in the 
face of the consequences and triggered follow-up costs, the state’s benefits from all three 
resources are comparably small, rendering the management of the subsoil assets unsustain-
able for Germany and its citizens. Thereby, the German subsurface governance fits into the 
recurring pattern of privatising profits, while socialising losses and costs.
In order to adapt the governance, politicians have taken a first step in the right 
direction by modifying the financial equalisation system between states. By reducing 
the weighting of royalties from 100% to a third, states are encouraged to levy higher 
rates. However, to accomplish a sustainable subsurface governance, further changes are 
needed. Most importantly, the Federal Mining Act must be adapted, implementing an 
easier possibility for mining authorities to deny claims for environmental and/or social 
reasons. The priority of minerals supply in the Federal Mining Act must concede for 
a sustainable resource management. Discussions regarding those objections have been 
frequent but never materialised in the form of legislation. The latest foray for a reform 
of the BBergG by the state of Lower Saxony has been rejected by the Federal Council in 
November 2020 (Niedersächsischer Landtag 2020). Furthermore, the Federal Supreme 
Court’s 2013 decision emphasising the social obligation of ownership must be imple-
mented, in order to simplify the uncompensated expropriation of harmful resources. 
Additionally, on a state level, incentives for environmentally unfriendly exploitation 
must be abolished. With an implementation of those changes, a sustainable governance 
of the subsurface could be reached. Thus, the German subsurface would be managed 
in favour of Germany’s current and future citizens. Finally, this country-specific study 
should also be performed for other countries, in order to achieve a worldwide sustain-
able use, management and governance of the Earth’s resources.
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Appendix
A1: Calculation of the lignite market value
This calculation path is used by the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural 
Resources to assess the lignite’s market value:
with V (in €/t) as the lignite’s market value, C (in €/tonnes coal equivalent (tce)) as the 
lignite production’s full costs in 2005 (EWI/EEFA 2007), P (in %) as the producer price 
index for lignite normalised to 2005 (Destatis 2020a) and H (in tce/t) as the lignite district 
specific heating value (Niemann-Delius et al. 2009).
A2: Adjustment of the acquisition prices
The acquisition prices in DM are mentioned in a newspaper article and a press agency 
report (Schwenn 1994; DPA 1993). The MIBRAG purchase included 41.1% of a new 2.7 
billion DM power plant, which is subtracted from the original price (Reuters 1993). The 
prices are converted to € with the official exchange rate of 1 € = 1.9558 DM and inflation-
adjusted with the consumer price index (CPI) (Destatis 2020c). The theoretical royalties 
are calculated from the extraction rates and are also inflation-adjusted with the CPI (Statis-
tik der Braunkohle 2019; Destatis 2020c). For the year 1994, a fourth of LAUBAG’s 1994 
extraction rate has been considered, as it was sold in the course of September. For the same 
year, the missing information for the producer price index for lignite has been estimated 
conservatively to 0.95% of 2005’s value (0.98% in 1995).
A3: Calculation of the costs for not meeting the Paris Agreement’s goals
The calculation is based on Höhne and Fekete (2019), calculating the costs of missing the 
Paris Agreement’s goals for the transport sector. According to BMU (2016), the energy sec-
tor envisions to emit between 175 and 183 megatons of CO2-equivalent (MtCO2-eq) in 2030, 
compared to 358 MtCO2-eq in 2014. The government’s projection plans with 297.3 MtCO2
-eq in 2020, 301.5 MtCO2-eq in 2025 and 267.3 MtCO2-eq in 2030. We adopted a linear inter-
polation for the emission goals and the projection and calculated the annual CO2-equivalent 
emission surplus. The period where compensations are due starts in 2021 and every annual 
surplus is transferred in the next year’s calculation with an 8% surcharge (Höhne and Fekete 
2019). The added up surplus has to be compensated with emission certificates in 2030. In the 
German projection report by BMU (2019), the certificate’s price is assessed to 35€ in 2030, 
following the EU-Guidelines 2018. This adds up to 25.8 billion € and 27.8 billion € for 183 
and 175 MtCO2-eq as goals for 2030, respectively. These are the equations for the costs C:
V = C ⋅ P ⋅ H
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with p(y) as projection and g(y) as goals.
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